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distinction between intrinsic and inherent values. He
recognizes that intrinsic value has been defined as:
"what is desired for its own sake," "what would be good
even if it existed in isolation from everything else, what
ought to exist for its own sake," and "what is valued or
preferred in itself."3 But inherent values are defined
in much the same language as "having value in
themselves,"4 or as "ends in themselves."s Regan
differentiates between intrinsic and inherent values
primarily by example rather than formally or
conceptually, and this distinction would work just as
well as a pluralistic theory of intrinsic good which
affirms that more than one kind of thing---e.g. pleasures
and individuals--are valuable in and of themselves.
Nevertheless, inherent values are incommensurate
with and not reducible to intrinsic values, Regan insists.
A pluralistic theory of intrinsic value could also make
such a claim. Regan explains that "we cannot determine
the inherent value of individual moral agents by totaling
the intrinsic values of their experiences. Those who have
a more pleasant or happier life do not therefore have
greater inherent value than those whose lives are less
pleasant or happy."6 This could be just as well expressed
by saying that individual subjects-of-a-life and their
pleasant experiences both have intrinsic value and that
the value of the former is incommensurate with and
not reducible to the value of the latter. I will continue
to use Regan's language, however.

Tom Regan's seafaring dog that is justifiably thrown
out of the lifeboat built for four to save the lives of four
humans has been the topic of much discussion. Critics
have argued in a variety of ways that this dog nips at
Regan's achilles heel. Without reviewing previous
discussions, with much of which I certainly agree, I
wish to develop an unexplored approach to exposing
the vulnerability of the position which Regan takes on
sacrificing the dog to save the humans. I will argue that
when dealing with the seafaring dog Regan abandons
his own principles and that this is exactly what he should
do. Regan should abandon his view that all subjectsof-a-life have equal inherent worth.
Inherent and Intrinsic Worth
Regan makes a theoretically significant distinction
between two kinds of value, intrinsic and inherent.
Intrinsically valuable things are experiences like
pleasures or preference satisfactions.' Inherently
valuable things are individual subjects of a life. 2
Presumably, both intrinsic and inherent values are
desirable for their own sakes and are ends in themselves.
Regan fails to make a clear conceptual or definitional

Fall 1993

PHILOSOPHY

231

Between the Species

Tom Regan's Seafaring Dog and (Un)Equal Inherent Worth

Subjects-of-a-life are described as having

virtue, or what have you, that they exemplify.ll I will
not argue further for this here, but obviously this claim
may be accepted while rejecting Regan's further claim
that all animals (normal mammals) have equal inherent
worth because they are all equally subjects-of-a-life.
Regan contends "subject-of-a-life" is a categorical
concept, that there can not be degrees of it "depending
on the degree to which they have or lack some favored
ability or virtue."12
Despite Regan's insistence to the contrary, it seems
to me that there are degrees of being the subject-of-alife. By degrees I mean that subjects-of-a-life differ
immensely with respect to
l. the complexity of their organization,
2. the extent to which they exemplify the defining
characteristics of the notioll, and
3. the richness with which they may manifest
additional traits of subjectivity conspicuously
absent from Regan's list like rationality, selfconsciousness, moral agency, etc..
All of the defining characteristics in Regan's notion of
a subject-of-a-life are ability or capacity concepts, and
there can be and indeed are all sorts of degrees of each
of these characteristics to be found among species of
normal mammals, humans included. Regan does not
pickj ust one or two favored abilities or virtues; he picks
a large assortment of them. Yet, all of the abilities Regan
includes can and do exist as degrees of ability or
capacity and as actualized properties in various species
and individuals.
Regan does not avoid favoring preferred abilities
(perfectionism) just because his list includes a large
conglomeration of them! Look carefully at his concept
of subject-of-a-life and you will realize that among
mammals there are many degrees of the abili ties to have
beliefs, desires, perceptions, memories, a sense of the
future including one's own, emotions, feelings of
pleasure and pain, preference and welfare interests,
ability to initiate action in pursuit of desires and goals,
psychophysical identity over time, and individual
welfare. It may be difficult and at times impossible to
measure carefully and compare all of these differences,
but they clearly exist among subjects-of-a-life, and they
are the defining characteristics of such subjects.
It might be replied that all mammals as wholes are
still equally subjects-of-a-life even though their parts
differ in degrees, that the preceding argument commits
a fallacy of composition. However, it is not always a
fallacy to reason from parts to wholes;13 and it is not at

beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and
a sense of the future, including their own
future; an emotional life together with feelings
of pleasure and pain; preference and welfareinterests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit
of their desires and goals; a psychophysical
identity over time; and an individual welfare
in the sense that their experiential life fares
well or ill for them, logically independently
of their utility for others and logically
independently of their being the object of
anyone else's interests. 7
Not all animals are subjects-of-a-life, but normal
mammals a year old or more clearly are; and many other
animals who lack some of the above traits should be
given the benefit of the doubt, Regan thinks. 8 I will
follow Regan in using the word "animal" hereafter to
refer to those which clearly are subjects-of-a-life. Both
moral agents who have moral duties and moral patients
to whom duties are owed are subjects-of-a-life (at least·
if they are normal mammals a year old or more) and
thus are inherently valuable.9
Regan insists that all animals (in the above sense)
have equal inherent value, that the notion is categorical
and not comparative; but the experiences of individual
animals may have very unequal intrinsic value.
Conscious individuals may differ significantly in
pleasures or desire satisfactions while remaining equal
as subjects-of-a-life. Regan correctly affirms that
traditional utilitarians, who emphasize pleasures or
desire satisfactions, and perfectionists, who emphasize
virtues and talents, recognize only intrinsic value but
not inherent value in individual centers of conscious
experience and activity. According to these ethical
theories, individual centers of conscious experience and
activity have the instrumental worth of an empty bucket
or receptacle into which intrinsically good stuff like
pleasures or talents can be poured; but the receptacles
themselves have no intrinsic or inherent worth.
Traditional utilitarianism and perfectionism did not
recognize that individuals are ends in themselves. 10
I think we should agree with Regan that individual
centers of conscious experience, whether human or nonhuman, are valuable in and of themselves and that their
value is more than the sum of the value of the universal
and repeatable goods like pleasure, talent, knowledge,
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all implausible that if two mammals (say a human and
a dog) differ significantly in their capacities for
emotions, satisfactions, pleasures and pains, etc., they
differ in the degree to which they are subjects-of-a-life
since these are among the defining characteristics of
such subjects. It might also be replied that being the
subject-of-a-life consist not simply of the presence of
these defining abilities but also of the unique way in
which they are integrated into the complex subjectivity
of each distinctive individual. Unfortunately, this turn
to uniqueness can not be used to defend Regan's
contention that all mammals are subjects-of-a-life
equally. The latter is presumably something they all have
in common, but uniqueness is something by which they
all differ. Of course, all unique things have uniqueness
in common, but since uniqueness means being different,
this says only that what they have in common is being
different, not that they are equally subjects of a life.
Regan should conclude that animals are not all equal
with respect to the value of being unique subjects-of-alife because they differ immensely with respect to the
complexity and richness of their properties as such.

However, Regan's worse-off principle is supposed to
save the day for the humans and doom the dog. Regan
writes that "Our belief that it is the dog who should be
killed is justified by appeal to the worse-off principle." 15
Regan's miniride principle would allow sacrificing the
life of one individual where necessary to save the lives
of many when harms to each are comparable; but his
worse-off principle forbids sacrificing the life of one
individual where necessary to save the lives of many
when the harms to each are not comparable. However,
it permits sacrificing the life of one individual to save a
second individual if the death of the second would be
worse than the death of the firsL 16 Thus, if the harm
that would befall the dog if drowned is comparable to
the harm that would befall each of the humans if
drowned, it would be wrong to sacrifice the dog. Regan
argues, however, that the harms would not be
comparable, that the death of the person would be worse
than the death of the dog, and that it is therefore
justifiable to drown the dog. Indeed, for this reason it
would be justifiable if necessary to throw a million dogs
overboard to save one human. I? As Regan expresses it,

Regan's Seafaring Dog

All on board [the lifeboat] have equal inherent
value and an equal prima facie right not to be
harmed. Now, the harm that death is, is a
function of the opportunities for satisfaction
it forecloses, and no reasonable person would
deny that the death of any of the four humans
would be a greater prima facie loss, and thus a
greater prima facie harm, than would be true
in the case of the dog. Death for the dog, in
short, though a harm, is not comparable to the
harm that death would be for any of the
humans. To throw anyone of the humans
overboard, to face certain death, would be to
make that individual worse-off (Le. would
cause that individual a greater harm) than the
harm that would be done to the dog if the
animal was thrown overboard. 18

Let us now apply the above reflections to the case of
Regan's ill fated dog who must be cast overboard to
save the lives of four humans on a four person only
raft. Is it right or wrong for the four persons to jettison
the dog to save themselves? Regan insists that to harm
individual subjects-of-a-life

merely in order to produce the best consequences for all involved-is to treat them
unjustly-because it fails to respect their
inherent value. To borrow part of a phrase from
Kant, individuals who have inherent value
must never be treated merely as a means to
securing the best aggregate consequences. 14
By the best aggregate consequences Regan means
the given totality of the intrinsic values of pleasure,
preference fulfillment, etc. Applied to the lifeboat
situation, it would appear at first to be unjust to harm
(Le. drown) the dog merely to produce the best
aggregate consequences for the four humans because
doing so would fail to respect the dog's inherent value
and would treat it merely as a means to securing the
most pleasure, preference fulfillment, etc. for the men.
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It is indeed unfortunate that Regan seems to forget
his distinction between inherent and intrinsic value
when he analyzes the harm ofdeath. His great failure
here is that he focuses exclusively on the loss of
opportunities for the realization of intrinsic value
("satisfaction"). However, if individual subjects-of-alife do indeed have inherent value as well as
opportunities for the realization of intrinsic value, surely
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death involves much greater harm than a mere loss of
opportunities for satisfaction. It also involves the

respect for each contender for life instead of sacrificing
the dog in preference to one of the humans; but he rejects
this possibility on the grounds that "no reasonable
person would suppose that the dog has a 'right to life'
that is equal to the humans' or that the animal should
be given an equal chance in the lottery for survival."22
However, a lottery like drawing straws is precisely the
correct moral strategy for choosing among equals when
lifesaving resources are too scarce to save all. Regan
rejects a lottery only at the price of ignoring his own
cherished doctrine of equality of inherent worth among
subjects-of-a-life. In the fmal analysis, on Regan's view,
all that we need to consider is unequal intrinsic worth.
Regan's resolution of the lifeboat case depends
entirely upon inequalities of intrinsic value, despite
equalities of inherent value. He may not aggregate these
by summing up the future pleasures or satisfactions of
all four of the human survivors and weighing these
against the future pleasures or satisfactions of one dog
or even a million dogs; but it is unclear why this should
not be done once the decision has been made to regard
the loss of intrinsic values as the only undesirable
consequence of death. Regan certainly does aggregate
the future satisfactions of the one dog and weigh them
to fmd them wanting compared to the future satisfactions
of one of the humans. If satisfactions can be aggregated
and compared within two individuals, why shouldn't
they be aggregated between many individuals? Regan
simply ignores the supposedly equal inherent worths
of the man and the dog, and justifies drowning the dog
solely on the basis of inequalities of future satisfactions,
i.e. on differences of intrinsic value, or on the best
aggregate consequences. It is as if Regan thinks that
equal inherent worths cancel out one another when one
life must be chosen against another. Regan insists that
"individuals who have inherent value are not to be
treated as if they were mere 'receptacles' of valuable
experiences (e.g., pleasures) ... "23; but once equal
inherent values are allowed to cancel out one another,
what remains is merely individuals as receptacles.
If I am right, however, that all subjects-of-a-life do
not have equal inherent worth, and if, as they typically
are, the human subjects-of-a-life are indeed much more
complex, intense, and richer in properties than that of
the dog, then casting the dog overboard is justified bOth
in terms of inherent and intrinsic value. The dog has
both less inherent worth as a unique individual and
fewer opportunities for future satisfactions than the
humans, and for both of these reasons it is unreasonable

extinction and loss ofall the inherent worth ofbeing a
unique subject-of-a-life.U Regan is right that this is equal
for all such subjects, then death is just as great a loss in
this important respect for the dog as for the humans.
It is true that nonnal humans would typically have
more opportunities for satisfaction than a normal dog.
This might not be so in the unusual circumstances
described by Judith Barad-Andrade in which the four
humans at sea all "work in the same assembly line... ,
have a cynical attitude toward life, are companionless,
and when not at work can almost always be found in
front of the television set," and the seafaring dog by
contrast "has close ties with her human family, has
puppies waiting for her at home, enjoys riding in the
car and long walks, and has an interest in investigating
new places and meeting new creatures" and has recently
"displayed her courage and loyalty by rescuing a young
friend from a burning building."19 But let us assume
that the dog is a couch potato and the humans are
intensely involved morally and aesthetically with others
and with the world. Then their opportunities for
satisfaction would, as Regan suggests, outweigh those
of the dog; but this shows only that their loss of intrinsic
value would be greater. It does not show that their loss
of inherent value would be greater than the dog's loss
of the same. In fact, their lost of inherent value would
be identical if Regan is right that all subjects-of-a-life
have equal inherent worth. Regan claims that "The
selection of the dog does not conflict with recognizing
the animal's equal inherent value... "20 but it most
certainly does because it ignores the fact that extinction
of the animal's inherent value would be just as great a
loss for it as would the extinction of one of the human's
inherent value, if indeed their inherent values are equal.
Regan seems to think that casting the dog overboard is
not incompatible with recognizing its equal inherent
value because the dog's losses are not outweighed by
summing up the losses of the group of humans in the
lifeboat,21 but the real incompatibility arises simply by
not allowing equal inherent value to count and by basing
the choice upon the unequal intrinsic worth of the dog
and one of the humans. Equal rights supposedly depend
on equality of inherent worth, but in the lifeboat
situation inequalities of intrinsic worth give the person
stronger rights to life and freedom from harm.
Regan considers the possibility that those in the
lifeboat should draw straws as an expression of equal
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to suppose that the dog has a right to life that is equal to
that of the humans or that it should be given an equal
chance in the lottery for survival.
There is a sense, of course, in which planet earth is
a giant lifeboat situation in which some individuals must
die to save otllers from deaili. Much human experimentation on animals is commercial rather ilian medical,
and much medical experimentation aims at developing
the means to prevent harms (like discomforts,
dysfunctions, or deformities) that are less severe ilian
the loss of life. Still, some medical experimentation on
animals clearly aims at saving lives or preventing
premature deaths for both animals and humans. Both
Regan's reasoning and my own would seem to justify
such experimentation on animals, especially if it has a
reasonable probability of success. Indeed, Regan's
reasoning would justify terminal experiments on
millions of animals just to save one normal human
being. Either the animals or the person will .die
prematurely, ilie former in terminal medical experiments, ilie latter from some terminal disease for which
we presently have no cure. In considering toxicity tests
of new drugs, Regan argues that animals should not be
used because they have not voluntarily pla~d themselves
at risk for such perils,24 but Regan does not consider
whether the seafaring dog voluntarily agreed to go to
sea. In the lifebo:lt situation, this consideration is
irrelevant, so it should be equally irrelevant in the lifeboat
of toxicity testing. So, should the animals be "thrown
overboard" to save the human? Regan's answer must be
affmnative, given his solution to ilie case of the seafaring
dog, because anticipated harms to each are incomparable,
Le. because the loss of opportunities for satisfaction for
the person is much greater than the loss of satisfaction
for anyone of the animals. I would agree, but I would
add that ilie loss of the inherent worth of being the subjectof-a-life is also greater for me person than for me dog,
because the inherent worm of each is also incomparable.
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